Transformation of Intimacy: Chapters 8-10

In chapter 8, Giddens explores episodic encounters. He questions if this is a way of avoiding intimacy, or could it be a way of expanding on the relationship? I wonder if episodic encounters really are incompatible with the ‘norms’ and ‘rules’ of the “pure relationships”. (147) He also ventures into the concept of plastic sexuality. He essentially defines this as “sex detached from its age-old subservience to differential power” (147). He discusses the visible deconstructions of maleness: “the leather queen”, “macho gay”, and “denim groupie” Giddens brings up a good point that as much as they are pushing limits, they are simultaneously affirming what has already been taken for granted by phallic power in our society— and that our identity, all aspects of it is reflexive.

Giddens discloses thoughts from an interview with a woman on homosexual relationships. She claims that homosexual relationships can be very long term, but are usually not “for life” (148). She also says she feels heterosexual couples stay together longer than gay couples do, even though with recent movements that this is changing. I would argue she feels this way only because heterosexual couples have been the only “acceptable” type of marriage in the past. If the norm were that heterosexual couples traditionally didn’t get married to become life partners if she would still feel this same way about hetero and homosexual relationships/marriages? Heterosexual relationships are already so prescribed to be a certain way, that I feel homosexual marriages (if and when legally accepted) could be more freeing because the couple can really choose what they want the relationship to look like. At the risk of sounding really naive, could I suggest that gay couples maybe have more room to create a different kind of “marriage” because they are not confined by tradition?

In one of Hite’s studies she found that heterosexual women said they wanted more “verbal closeness”. Is it socially constructed that women need more “verbal closeness”? Are women training to think like a “woman?” I just don’t see how that need can be biological. I feel its all about expectations and roles-- and because women and men have been socialized to have different expectations then they inevitably act accordingly because that it what they have been taught to feel (148).

Giddens discusses “equalization” as a very important part of the transformation of intimacy. He tends to make huge generalizations when discussing this, “women are angry at men for…” and “men’s anger against women is because of…”(149). He mentions that men are becoming zombies—“all playing the rules of the male game plan and as a consequence have lost touch with, or are running away from their feelings and awareness of themselves as people’ (149).

He then moves on to a (dramatic, in my opinion) discussion of Goldberg’s ideas about the “hazards of being male”. I mean, saying “men are in a no-win situation” if choosing to be in a relationship—really? (Maybe this offended my because I do have a unwarranted fear of being in a relationship with a person who only feels confined, and over-bared by the relationship itself). It seems he does a lot of blaming the woman, as if it were her fault for choosing such a guy to be in relationship. Well since he generalized about men so much, it seems women wouldn’t have much of a choice since apparently all men feel the same about relationships with women anyway (i.e. “Women become angered by the very characteristics that attracted them in the first place”. (150)). It must be the woman’s fault because “many women are likely to long precisely for the kind of man who won’t commit; indeed, an aversion to commitment, for reasons already explained, often maximizes both his attractiveness and the challenge he offers” (154).

Barbara Enhrenreich brings up the ‘male rebellion’—to stay free a male has to stay single. She addresses the historical notion that men once were supposed to live longer, until the stress from being the sole provider and harder workers built up and they became physiologically weaker than women (because women were probably never ever stressed themselves, right?). Men therefore, began to renounce their breadwinner role- taking care of themselves financially and pushing off all other responsibilities to the women. Goldberg recommends that men change themselves by enhancing their friendships with other men, by developing a feminine side and by choosing to be with women who are autonomous.

Chapter 9 was not easy for me to understand. Between the conflicting yet consistent viewpoints of Reich, Marcuse and their comparison to Foucault, it was hard to follow. Nevertheless, these were the main points. Reich makes the statement that a sociopolitical reform without sexual liberation is practically impossible, because freedom and sexual health are the same thing. He does value Freud’s Free Association technique; he feels it deviates from a persons true problems. Herbert Marcuse criticizes ego psychology and explores the burden of repression and its negative effects on our society. Both Reich and Marcuse believe that modern civilization is inherently repressive.

Giddens take a second to figure out what it means to say that we are fixated with sexuality as a culture. He suggests three interpretations. The first is that because sexuality breeds pleasure and pleasure is the basis of our capitalist culture, then we can therefore assume that sexuality is a production of a capitalistic order. The second interpretation is construed under the influence of Foucault and Freud, whom suggested that “sex as truth” is the basis of modern thought in our society. The third interpretation he poses is that sex is an addiction. This addiction is seen as central to our compulsive qualities of sexual behavior-- which is exhibited through our addiction to porn, media, films, magazines (and other ways in which we can pursue our sexual desires). Giddens proposes that the solution is in recognizing the “confinement or denial of female sexual responsiveness and the generalized acceptance of male sexuality as unproblematic”…he goes on to say “the more sexuality became detached from reproduction, and integrated within an emerging reflexive project of self, the more this institutional system of repression came under tension” (178). Sexual emancipation, “what used to be called perversions are merely ways in which sexuality can legitimately be expressed and self-identity defined” (179). I like that he talks about how by recognizing these “perversions” it can eventually lead to an acceptance of many ways to carry out sexual lives. Radical pluralism becomes an “emancipatory endeavor” in which we can open new doors for our sexual choices without the barriers of moral judgment.

In chapter 10“Intimacy as Democracy” he defines democracy and shows how they are invariably linked to autonomy. Democracy essentially means that people can develop, learn, think, feel, free of judgment and will be heard even if of the minority.

The principle of autonomy is “individuals should be free and equal in the determination of the conditions of their own lives; that is, they should enjoy equal rights (and, accordingly, equal obligations) in the specification of the framework which generates and limits the opportunities available to them, so long as they do not deploy this framework to negate the rights of others” (186). He discusses how institutionalizing the principle of autonomy means “specifying rights and obligations, which have to be substantive, not just formal” …he goes on to say “rights are essentially forms of empowerment; they are enabling devices” (187). And as I agree, rights are empowering—they tend to be empowering for some, not all people. I think that is important to acknowledge. However, I do like how he mentions that “rights and duties thus have to be made a focus of continual reflexive attention”. He moves on to say that the promise of intimacy is the promise of democracy. We need democracy in a relationship in order to achieve intimacy. Women need it as empowerment so they can get out of abusive, violent or oppressive relationships. With democracy comes the dissolution of arbitrary power (which is usually given to males). Giddens also mentions the importance of trust in this issue. Without trust you can have no accountability because one or the other is inspecting and analyzing the motives of the other person. I don’t like that Giddens compares parent-child relationships to political order. I’d like to think there is something different, maybe more emotional, vulnerable and human, about a parent-child relationship than what exists within our political sphere.

Giddens write that “the advancement of self-autonomy in the context of pure relationships is rich with implications for democratic practice in the larger community” (195). He suggests a similarity between democracy of the personal life and democracy of political life. He supports this statement by saying “through mutual threats and attrition, one side or other is worn down and an outcome achieved” (196). Principled negotiation leads to respectful conversation, which inevitably is good democratic communication between any two parties—no matter which sphere political or personal. He discusses how sexuality awakened personal politics and therefore how institutional reflexivity of life politics (i.e. self identity) is a topic we should all pay more attention to.

He discusses how the question “who will I be?” goes hand in hand with “how shall I live”, and these two questions are wrapped up around our (binary) conception of gender. He lists five gender attributions: every person is either male or female, characteristics are either masculine or feminine, gender cues are assessed within the barriers of typical gender behavioral patterns, the difference between gender only enhances our limited views of sexual identities, how we act is because of what we have “naturally” been given. Sex identity is slowly becoming less confining, as society accepts our bodies as something other than what nature gave us. He ends the chapter with a discussion of how emotions affect our behavior, judgments and communication within relationships. I think that it is important to recognize the power of emotional responses. Not every aspect of a relationship can be compared to the realm of communication within politics.

Masculinities: Introduction & Chapters 2, 3

In the Introduction Connell proves that he has thought much about the importance and implications of his book. By reconstructing the concept of ‘hegemonic masculinity’ we will be able to apply it to more practical issues (like the prevention of violence, fathering, health, etc). He wants masculinity research to be integrated with more general analyses of social change. “He argues that a binary division between sex and gender, as well as other binaries (man/woman, hetero/homosexual, for instance) pervade research on masculinities, and need to be disrupted” (xix). I like that Connell brings up the Global Dimension. He states how complicated and difficult it is to recognize a “world gender order”, and how understanding local problems are no longer good enough and we need to begin to face the larger issues of our institutions and cultural conflicts. I like that Connell takes the time to discuss this problem—and really begin the process of understanding masculinity on global level.

In Chapter 2, Connell immediately brings up one main common thread belief that is perpetuating the gender binary-- there is a fixed, “true” masculinity. And that this true masculinity is inherent and displayed through the male body. He supports this when he says either “the body drives and directs action” (ex) men are more aggressive than women), or “the body sets limits to action” (ex) men naturally do not take care of infants) (45). So he suggests we, as a society, should work harder to understand the current conception of the male body. He defines two misconceptions: the body is a natural machine which produces gender difference, and the other is that the body is merely a surface by which we are socially imprinted. It is so confining to think that our tendencies such as who we are as a parent, friend, how we act politically, how we act territorial are defined just by what we inherited. He makes a good point when he says “where difference appear, they are small compared to variation within either sex, ad very small compared to differences in the social positioning of men and women” (47).He argues that men are not ‘hard-wired’ to be extremely aggressive and dominant, like many assume. He suggests that when we turn globally, there are examples of cultures that do not fit the “norm” of women raising children, and men being the most aggressive. Connell directs his research to how the medical world has been designed to reinforce gendered bodies. Cosmetic surgery is commonplace and accepted as something a woman should want, but become so naturalized that a woman may feel she it is a need. In addition, there are now penile implants to ensure masculinity for every male. Connell does not deny the fact that bodies are important, “there is an irreducible bodily dimension in experience and practice” (51). He asks if we can settle for the assertion that both biology and culture are responsible for our performance of gender, and questions “if biological determinism is wrong, and social determinism is wrong then it is unlikely that a combination of the two will be right” (52). Because social practices elaborate, complicate, deny, modify bodily difference we need to find a new way to think about gender and go beyond the compromise of biological and social determination.

Connell goes on to discuss ‘the Body Inescapable’. He acknowledges that “maleness” and “femaleness” is the predominant way of interpreting gender in our cultural. Because our bodily experience is central in our memories of whom and what we are, it therefore becomes imperative in understanding of ourselves. Organized sports serve as a specific example of this symbolized bodily performance. As much as it perpetuates the idea that men are superior and more “masculine”, it also shows that kinetically, by running, jumping, throwing etc we tend to move differently—and these two aspects depend and reinforce each other. Connell discusses the faulty connection between masculinity and machinery. The fact that physical capabilities are promoted as economic assets by our labor force reflects our social construction of an economic reality, this “emphasis of masculinity in industrial labor has been both a means of survival, in exploitative class relations, and a means of asserting superiority over women” (55). He turns to our cyber oriented world to show how the man-machine relationship is reinforced through the gendered language, graphics, advertisements, etc. He states although the ‘body is inescapable in the construction of masculinity, the inescapable is not fixed’ (56).

Although our bodies are malleable, and can be used as tools and instruments, they do have their limits—“bodies cannot be understood as a neutral medium for social practice. Their materiality matters” (58). Examples could be sex, sports and manual labor. Gender-switching becomes an important issues as well, seeing as it is changing ones body to fit the symbolic notion of what one initially felt confined as before. Connell is arguing for a theory in which we are able to see our bodies as sharing, shaping and generating social agency. The body reflexive practice is the notion that the public gender meanings are instantly merged with the activity of the body and the inevitable emotions of the relationship between the two. The story of Adam shows how the body-reflexive plays out in sports. Adam didn’t want to throw the ball because he was scared that his father would see his ability to throw as “girly”, which threatens his seen and felt masculinity. “The social semiotics of gender, with its emphasis on the endless play of signification, the multiplicity of discourses and the diversity of subject positions, has been important in escaping the rigidities of biological determinism.” (65). He ends chapter two with recovering how practice reinforces what we see as normal, constituting and re-constituting structures—making the reality we live in. “As bodily reflexive practices they constitute a world which has a bodily dimension, but is not biologically determined” (65). Gendered politics is an embodied-social politics.

Connell starts Chapter 3 with the suggestion that “‘masculinity’ is not a coherent object about which a generalizing science can be produced” (67). We should try and see masculinity as a part of a larger construction. Connell claims all societies have meaning that constitutes gender but not necessarily the term ‘masculinity’. In defining masculinity, he makes it clear that it is not in contrast with ‘femininity’. Although historically this may have been true in regards to how women were treated merely as opposite of men, we need to abandon this idea of ‘separate spheres’ conjured during this time. Connell points out four main strategies that our culture uses to characterize masculinity: essentialist, positivist, normative and semiotic.

Essentialist definitions tend to take one trait or aspect central to the common view of ‘masculinity’. The obvious problem with essentialist definition is that the one trait or aspect chosen is completely arbitrary, and reinforces universality of these ever so subjective traits. Positivists turn to the ‘facts’ so they can have one distinct definition of masculinity, “what men actually are”. This is problematic because it discriminates against women and men (especially in research) -- validating only what they feel fits into this single definition and rejects what does not. By having just one archaic definition, we are losing sight of many identities (i.e. those who are ‘women’ but act ‘masculine’ and those who are ‘men’ but act ‘feminine’). Although it is useful for research and science purposes to have just one definition, “the terms ‘masculine’ and ‘feminine’ point beyond categorical sex difference to the ways men differ among themselves, and women differ among themselves, in matters of gender” (69). Normative definitions acknowledge and validate these differences and suggest that “masculinity is what men ought to be” (70). In this way men are able to ‘be’ masculine in many different ways and to varying degrees. This approach becomes difficult when taking into account personality. The semiotic approach defines masculinity through structural linguistics. In one way or another, masculinity is defined as ‘not-femininity’. This idea is commonly used in studying structural and cultural constructions of gender, and has been effective in this way. Although it leaves behind the randomness of essentialist definitions is it limited in its range of social discourse. Connell wraps up nicely by saying “Rather than attempting to define masculinity as an object (a natural character type, a behavioral average, norm), we need to focus on the processes and relationships through which men and women conduct gendered lives” (71).

Connell finishes this chapter by suggesting gender “as a way in which social practice is ordered” (71). Gender is not a social practice condensed to the body, it is a social practice that suggest our bodies and what they do. In other words, we are not a fixed set of genes or biological determinants. When we refer to ‘masculinity’ and ‘femininity’ we are referring to our constructions of how we practice gender. We should try and understand ourselves as ‘gender projects’, as ‘configuring gender through practice” (72). In the analysis of masculinity it is important to consider three important structures of gender: power (dismantling patriarchy), production (gender divisions of labor) and cathexis (emotional attachment). Seeing as how gender is “a way of structuring social practice in general not a special type of practice” it is inevitably intertwined with other social structures such as race and class (75). I appreciate the way Connell bring up these other factors such as race and class. By doing this he is choosing to complicate his thoughts and the issue at hand—for he could write another book just on that topic. Connell goes on to discuss four relations in ‘masculinity’: hegemony, subordination, complicity, and marginalization. He examines how these relationships give us a way to analyze masculinity in a more fluid way. He then discusses historical dynamics, violence and crisis tendencies, and how this effect gender relations. By recognizing they ways in which society is so intricate and complex, he is pushing further his cause of writing this book to enable others to do more research and reach further and more globally. To recognize masculinity (and femininity!) we have to look at these relationships between social structures, which he seems to effortlessly bring to our attention. Connell does an impeccable job of defining masculinity without actually defining it.